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Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
| Summary: | Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field. |
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| Subject: | Mathematics Matemática |
| Country: | Portugal |
| Document type: | journal article |
| Access type: | Restricted |
| Associated institution: | Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto |
| Language: | English |
| Origin: | Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto |
| Summary: | Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field. |
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