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Two new power indices based on winning coalitions

Bibliographic Details
Summary:Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.
Subject:Mathematics Matemática
Country:Portugal
Document type:journal article
Access type:Restricted
Associated institution:Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto
Language:English
Origin:Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto
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conditionsOfAccess_str restricted access
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description Deegan and Packel (1979) and Holler (1982) proposed two power indices for simple games: the Deegan-Packel index and the Public Good Index. In the definition of these indices, only minimal winning coalitions are taken into account. Using similar arguments, we define two new power indices. These new indices are defined taking into account only those winning coalitions that do not contain null players. The results obtained with the different power indices are compared by means of two real-world examples taken from the political field.
documentTypeURL_str http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
documentType_str journal article
id c50ad77c-dcd4-43a3-9e35-8a640aa0c24e
identifierHandle_str https://hdl.handle.net/10216/97549
language eng
relatedInstitutions_str_mv Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto
resourceName_str Repositório Aberto da Universidade do Porto
spellingShingle Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
Mathematics
Matemática
title Two new power indices based on winning coalitions
topic Mathematics
Matemática